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The issue
• When government has to resort to tax on factor income, what
should be the optimal tax on capital income, vs. that on labor
income, in a macro growth context?
• In the standard Ramsey-type growth models, the optimal tax
on capital income is zero. See Judd (1985) and Chamley
(1986), and subsequently extensions.
• However, in life-cycle (overlapping generations) models, the
growth maximizing tax policy is to set the tax rate on capital
income as high as possible (under certain plausible conditions).
See Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballe (1998).
• The reality is neither!
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The issue
• In the Ramsey growth model, various extensions have
been made to generate non-zero optimal tax on capital:
– by incorporating distortions such as externalities of capital
taxation (Barro 1990, Chen 2007) and imperfectly
competitive product market (Guo and Lansing 1999).
– by incorporating human capital accumulation in a two-sector
growth model, where human capital is the engine of long-run
growth (Chen and Lu 2013).
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The issue
• In the overlapping generations model, there are two
opposing effects of capital taxation on growth via
savings.
– As is standard, higher capital income taxation leads to less
savings as it lowers returns (net interest rate) on savings.
– Higher capital income taxation alleviates the need for labor
income taxation, resulting in more savings when young.
– Provided that the interest elasticity of savings is sufficiently
low, therefore, raising capital income taxation will result in
higher savings and hence growth.
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The issue
• In the multi-periods life cycle models, studies have
established that positive capital income tax can be
optimal:
– with multiple but finite periods of a life cycle and elastic
labor-leisure choice in each period, the optimal tax policy
necessarily involves age-dependent tax rates on labor
income (Erosa and Gervais 2002);
– when age-dependent labor income tax is not feasible, a
positive tax rate on capital is optimal to mimic the required
age-dependent tax structure (Conesa et al. 2009).
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Our Approach
• In this paper, we reexamine the issue of optimal factor taxation
in a standard OLG model.
• A distinguishing feature of our model is that physical capital is
produced by risky projects that are partially financed through a
credit market with asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers (in the form of the standard CSV problem).
• The asymmetric information in the credit market brings
optimal contracting into the discussion.
• We show that the information friction introduces a rationale to
lower the optimal tax rate on capital, which will no longer be
as high as possible.
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Main Results
• In the truth-telling equilibrium, the monitoring probability
increases with the tax rate on capital income.
• The equilibrium monitoring probability also rises with the
reliance on external financing in the credit market.
• To the extent that monitoring is costly and hence causes credit
market distortions, external financing exacerbates the
information frictions.
• The growth- and welfare-maximizing tax rates on capital
income are lower with (i) more severe asymmetric information
friction, and (ii) greater reliance on external financing.
• Welfare maximizing capital income tax rate is smaller than the
growth maximizing counterpart.
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• Individuals live for 2 periods: young and old
• A θ fraction of young agents is lenders and a 1-θ fraction is
borrowers.
• Agents are risk neutral, work when young and consume when
old (thus have a zero interest elasticity of savings, which would
imply a corner solution for the optimal tax on capital in the
absence of any frictions)
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• Young lenders work and provide their wages as the source of
loans, which have alternative use via a safe storage technology
(yields ε units of consumption per unit of input)
• Young borrowers also work and seek loans to run risky
projects which produce capital goods in next period
• The returns of borrowers’ projects can take on one of two
possible values: 0 (with prob. π) and κ (with prob. 1- π)
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• The project realization is privately observed by its operator
(the borrower)
• Lenders can verify the project outcome via auditing, which has
a cost of δ amount of capital (per unit of loan)
• Lenders offer contract Ct = {Φt, Rt, qt}, where Φt is the
auditing probability, Rt is the loan rate, and qt is the loan size
(external financing)
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• Government levies a tax rate τρ on capital income and a tax
rate τw on labor income.
• Two technical assumptions:
(1 – π)κ – πδ > 0
γ2A[(1 – π) κ – πδ](1 – τρ) > ε
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• Due to competition, lenders maximize borrowers’ expected
payoff subject to constraints:
Max (1 – π)(1 – τρ)(κρt+1Qt – Rtqt)
(ICC)
s.t. (κρt+1Qt – Rtqt) ≥ (1 – Φt)κρt+1Qt
(1 – τρ)[(1 –π)Rt – πΦtδρt+1]qt = εqt (ZPC)
κρt+1 ≥ Rt
qt ≤ θ(1 – τw)wt/(1- θ)
Qt = (1 – τw)wt + qt

(PC)
(Resource constraint)
(internal and external financing)
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• In the truth-telling equilibrium, the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding.
• Since the participation constraint hold in strict inequality in
equilibrium, a borrower wants to borrow as much as possible,
and hence the resource constraint binds.
• The larger the fraction of lenders θ (relative to borrowers), the
greater the size of external financing for each project, making
the project more reliant on external financing.
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• Solution of the optimal contract:
Φt = Φ = ε/{γA[(1 – π)κ – θπδ] (1 – τρ)},
Rt = εκ/{[(1 – π)κ – θπδ] (1 – τρ)},
qt = θ(1 – τw)wt/(1- θ).
We have: 0< Φ <1, ∂Φ/∂τρ > 0 and ∂Φ/∂θ > 0.
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The Model: Credit Market Equil.
• The equilibrium monitoring probability increases with the tax
rate on capital income, because the a higher tax increases the
incentive to “cheat”.
• The equilibrium monitoring probability also increases with the
extent of external financing, because the incentive to “cheat”
also rises with the amount of external financing.
• Since monitoring entails loss of resource (a form of
inefficiency), our results suggest that both capital income
taxation and reliance on external finance exacerbate the
information distortions in the credit market.
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Optimal Taxation –
Growth Maximizing Case
• Solve it for the growth maximizing capital income tax rate:
∂ln(g)/∂τρ = 0 

θ
τ ρ = 1−
γ
*

(1 − α )πδε
A(1 − π )κ [(1 − π )κ − θπδ ]

We have:
0 < τ ρ* < 1, ∂τ ρ* / ∂δ < 0, ∂τ ρ* / ∂θ < 0.
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Optimal Taxation –
Growth Maximizing Case
• The auditing probability under the optimal tax policy of τρ* is:

φ =
*

(1 − π )κε
A(1 − α )πδ [(1 − π )κ − θπδ ]

Note that Φ* is
(i) increasing with θ: ∂Φ*/∂θ > 0;
(ii) U-shaped and non-monotonic in δ:
∂Φ*/∂δ < 0 when 0 < δ < (1 – π)κ/2θπ
∂Φ*/∂δ > 0 when (1 – π)κ/2θπ < δ < (1 – π)κ/θπ
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Optimal Taxation –
Growth Maximizing Case
• The optimal growth rate is:
*



α
γτ
−
(
1
π
)
κεπδ
−
ρ

g * = A(1 − γ ) (1 − π )κ − θ
1
−

A(1 − α )[(1 − π )κ − θπδ ] 
1− γ







Note that:

∂g * / ∂δ < 0, ∂g * / ∂θ < 0.
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Optimal Taxation –
Welfare Maximizing Case
• The welfare of all generations can be expressed by:

Π = Π 0 + βΠ1 + β Π 2 + ... = ∑t =0 β t Π t
2

+∞

where Π t denotes the total payoffs to all (old) members in
period t.
• Denote τ ρ** the welfare-maximizing tax rate on capital. We can
show that:
0 < τ ρ** < τ ρ* , ∂τ ρ** / ∂δ < 0, ∂τ ρ** / ∂θ < 0.
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Concluding Remarks
• In the presence of information friction, both capital taxation
and external financing worsen the incentive condition in the
credit market, which in turn lead to more stringent contract
enforcement/monitoring.
• Since enforcement is costly, from both the growth- and
welfare-maximizing perspectives, a more conservative tax on
capital is called for to mitigate the distortions resulted from
asymmetric information as well as from external financing.
• Empirical implications: economies with more severe
information frictions in the credit market and/or greater
reliance on external financing should tax capital less and tax
labor more.
• Some quantitative exercise would be helpful…
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